![]() Government aims, objectives, capabilities, or limitations for using social media and online technologies for external propaganda, instead offering an implicit assessment of these technologies in the final section on recommendations. The chapter does not explicitly list U.S. In addition, because online platforms are not the only means of disseminating propaganda, the chapter briefly describes relevant offline mechanisms for influence. It also identifies the capabilities and limitations for using online propaganda. For each case study, the chapter identifies the adversary’s aims and objectives in using online technologies for influence operations and propaganda. National Defense Strategy, and discussed in detail in chapter 11, IS remains, despite major recent setbacks, a modern violent extremist organization with global reach and sustained influence that will challenge America into this Great Power era. The first two are, as defined earlier in this volume, America’s modern Great Power rivals. It focuses on Russia, China, and the so-called Islamic State (IS). ![]() ![]() adversaries have used and are using online content and platforms to engage in foreign influence campaigns. This chapter offers a look at how three contemporary U.S. They can spread progovernment content, attack adversary positions, distract or divert conversations or criticism away from an issue, promote divisions and polarization, and suppress participation through attacks or harassment. Campaigns employ these types of accounts in numerous ways. To enable more sophisticated interactions with other users, bot campaigns employ real people or trolls to monitor and control fake social media accounts. Bots are automated social media accounts, often on Twitter, that employ code to replicate human activity to promote a particular message. States conduct online propaganda campaigns in a number of ways, including using “bot” and “troll” accounts. The campaigns can also be conducted at scale, and they can be informed by a wealth of easy-to-access big data on target audiences. Governments also seek to engage in such campaigns anonymously, thereby limiting the associated political and foreign policy risks. Why are states increasingly relying on social media as a tool of foreign propaganda? It is cheap and easy to operate and allows campaign planners to identify, target, and reach specific overseas audiences, such as individuals, voter demographics, and ethnic groups. ![]() In particular, the study documented foreign propaganda campaigns conducted by Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. This is up from 48 countries in 2018 and 28 countries in 2017. 1 A study from the University of Oxford documented that some 70 countries around the world are engaged in manipulating social media to serve domestic and foreign policy ends. The chapter also highlights key recommendations that the United States should adopt in order to counter adversary use of online propaganda.Īs the world has entered a new era of Great Power competition over the past decade, nation-states have been increasingly waging foreign propaganda campaigns on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, effectively turning such platforms into influence operations technologies. This chapter reviews the aims, capabilities, and limitations of online propaganda for each of these entities. adversaries that have exploited online technologies for propaganda. Russia, China, and the so-called Islamic State are three key U.S. Such campaigns are enticing because they are cheap and easy to execute they allow planners to identify, target, and reach specific audiences and the campaign’s anonymity limits the associated political and foreign policy risks. Nation-states have increasingly been waging foreign propaganda campaigns on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.
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